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Business War: Economic Espionage in the United
States and the European Union and the Need for
Greater Trade Secret Protection
I. Introduction
The arrest of senior FBI official Robert Hanssen in February of
this year reminded America of the dangers of foreign spying
against United States national security interests.1 Economic
espionage,2 however, is a less visible but more widespread form of
attack that is conducted by employees against their own
employers, by competing private companies, and by governments
seeking to protect or expand their national economies. Economic
espionage especially threatens intellectual property (IP), which has
become the most valuable asset of global business.4 In 1995, for
example, an employee of high-technology giant Intel attempted to
steal the blueprints for the Pentium processor developed through
years of research, development, and great cost.5 Although this
employee was arrested prior to transmitting the data to an Intel
competitor, he could have provided the information necessary to
create an identical competing product and put a billion-dollar U.S.
I Vernon Loeb & Walter Pincus, Invisible on the Inside; Knowing System Helped
Suspect Go Undetected, FBI Says, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2001, at Al.
2 Within this Comment, the terms economic espionage and industrial espionage
are used interchangeably and will be used to mean any illegal theft or misappropriation
of business information, or attacks on communications systems by a business competitor
or government entity.
3 Cybercrime, Transnational Crime, and Intellectual Property Theft: Hearing
Before the J. Econ. Comm., 105th Cong. 2-4 (1998) (statement of Neil J. Gallagher,
Deputy Assistant Director, Criminal Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation),
available at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress98/gallagher.htm.
4 Approximately seventy percent of the market value of a typical U.S. company is
in IP assets. AM. Soc'Y FOR INDUS. SEC. & PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, TRENDS IN
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION LOSS SURVEY REPORT 4 (1999) [hereinafter ASIS REPORT],
available at http://www.asisonline.org/spi.pdf.
5 Pete Carey, Software Engineer Charged in Theft of Pentium Plans from Intel,
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 24, 1995, at A8. According to 2000 data, Intel Corp. spends
approximately $3.9 billion on research and development annually. INTEL CORP., 2000
ANNUAL REPORT (2000), at http://www.intel.com/intel/annual00/.
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company out of business.6 More recently, Microsoft's network
was invaded by industrial hackers using a computer virus that
allowed them to steal pending Microsoft products, which were
traced to an electronic mail (e-mail) address in Russia.7 These
attacks against two sophisticated technology giants demonstrate
that all businesses are vulnerable to economic espionage.
In the United States and internationally, there is a dramatic rise
in the need for trade secret law, rather than patents, to protect IP
assets.8 The increasing value of trade secrets in the global
economy and the simultaneous proliferation of technology have
increased the opportunities and methods for conducting economic
espionage.9 This Comment contends that economic espionage by
private companies and national governments is dramatically
increasing'0 and that offensive economic espionage by the United
States and its allies is detrimental to greater IP protection, to
enhanced international cooperation against criminal organizations,
and to economic growth." Furthermore, increased economic
espionage creates a greater need for IP protection through trade
secret law. Accordingly, this Comment recommends, first, that in
the United States, individual states should adopt uniform civil and
criminal trade secret laws modeled after the U.S. Uniform Trade
Secrets Act (UTSA) 2 and the Economic Espionage Act (EEA). 13
6 Michelle Cole, Proliferation of High Tech Firms Fosters Espionage, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Apr. 27, 1997, at lOB.
7 Worming Out the Truth, ECONOMIST, Nov. 4, 2000, at 89. Microsoft was also
recently the victim of spying by Oracle Corp. Oracle hired a detective agency to sift
through Microsoft's lobbying firm's trash to acquire evidence that Microsoft wag
lobbying to influence the government's anti-trust case against it. Joe Lauria, Oracle
Caper Lifts Lid on America's Corporate Spies, SUNDAY TIMES (London), July 9, 2000, at
Business 6.
8 Robert Lamb, Economic and Financial Issues in Intellectual Property, in 3 INT'L
INTELL. PROP. LAW & POL'Y 36-38 (Hugh C. Hanson ed., 1998). Trade Secret law is
defined in Section II. See infra notes 41-155 and accompanying text.
9 Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States: Hearing
Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 105th Cong. 19 (1998) [hereinafter Freeh
Statement] (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation),
available at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress98/threats.htm.
10 See infra notes 20-40 and accompanying text.
I I See infra notes 156-251 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 74-94 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 102-155 and accompanying text.
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Second, in Europe, the European Union (EU)14 should explicitly
recognize and protect trade secrets. Third, the United States and
the EU should negotiate agreements to more effectively protect
these rights based on criminal protections in the EEA and the
World Intellectual Property Organization's Model Provisions on
Unfair Competition. Part II of this Comment explores the dramatic
rise in global economic espionage and the threat it poses to private
companies and national governments. 5 Part III of this Comment
reviews the federal law of trade secrets in the United States with
focus on the UTSA and the EEA.16 In Part IV, this Comment
examines the extent of international cooperation to protect trade
secrets. 7 Part V explores the protection of trade secrets in the EU
and the war of economic espionage between the United States and
the EU.'8 Finally, in Part VI, this Comment recommends a
framework on which the United States and the EU can increase
cooperation on trade secret law and decrease their offensive use of
economic espionage. 9
II. The Extent of the Problem
International economic espionage has existed for centuries.
Over 1,500 years ago a Chinese princess hid silkworms in her hat
and provided them to a man in India, thus revealing the secret of
silk making to a foreign government.2 ° China lost another valuable
industrial secret, the process for making high-quality porcelain,
when a visiting French Jesuit memorized the process and
described it in letters sent back to France.21 Today, industrial
espionage affects the entire U.S. economy. A study by the
American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) found that in
1999, Fortune 100022 companies sustained losses of more than $45
14 See infra notes 198-204 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 20-40 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 41-155 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 156-197 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 198-251 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 252-304 and accompanying text.
20 JACQUES BERGIER, SECRET ARMIES: THE GROWTH OF CORPORATE AND
INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE 3 (Harold J. Salemson trans., 1969).
21 Id. at 4.
22 Annually, Fortune Magazine ranks the top 500 and 1,000 U.S. companies in
2001]
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billion from thefts of trade secrets.23 The greatest number of
reported incidents came from the industrial areas of "high
technology" and "services," but the greatest financial loss was in
"manufacturing," averaging almost $50 million per incident.24 The
number of jobs lost to industrial spying has been estimated at six
million.2 ' The proliferation of global communication and
information systems, including the Internet, has significantly
increased the risks to corporate trade secrets. The world's reliance
on technology to transact business will mean that financial loss
from theft, misappropriation, and lost business opportunities will
increase in the foreseeable future.26
Generally, any country that competes in the world market has
a motivation to spy on its foreign competitors. 27  Economic
espionage, however, is most prevalent in the world's most
economically competitive nations and regions, including the
United States, Asia, and Western Europe.28 In 1998, the FBI
reported that there were twenty-three nations targeting the United
States for economic information, twelve of which were
terms of revenue generated and other economic factors. FORTUNE MAGAZINE, Apr. 16,
2000. For a list of the 2001 Fortune 500, see http://www.fortune.com (last visited Oct.
10, 2001).
23 ASIS REPORT, supra note 4, at 3. The ASIS Report is based on a survey in which
U.S. companies were asked to define their business and estimate their losses from the
theft of trade secrets. Information was analyzed from the ninety-seven companies
responding to the survey. The estimated loss of $45 billion is an extrapolation from data
provided by the responding companies to all Fortune 1000 companies. Id. at 25. The
Institute of Intellectual Property Law informally estimates the loss to U.S. industry at
$100 billion annually, factoring market losses and unrestricted technology transfers.
Caroline Palmer, How to Spot Your Office Spy, OBSERVER (London), Oct. 17, 1999, at
Business 16.
24 ASIS REPORT, supra note 4, at 6. The survey asked respondents to categorize
their business into four industrial categories including: "High Technology,"
"Financial/Insurance," "Manufacturing," and "Services." Id. There were 530 incidents in
high technology and 536 incidents in manufacturing. Id.
25 Economic Espionage Act: J. Hearing before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence
and the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech., and Gov't Info. of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong. 2 (1996) (statement of Sen. Specter) (noting an ABC News Report of six
million jobs lost).
26 ASIS REPORT, supra note 4, at 3.
27 Karen Sepura, Economic Espionage: The Front Line of a New World Economic
War, 26 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 127, 131 (1998).
28 Id.
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specifically targeting IP assets. 29 For example, the French
intelligence agency recently disclosed that it had bugged hotel
rooms and the first-class cabins of Air France jets and substituted
spies for flight attendants to eavesdrop on visiting foreign
executives.3 ° Similarly, a Japanese company bought a scrap metal
plant that contained damaged parts from a rival U.S. company's
machines to learn the weaknesses of that company's equipment;
the Japanese company then used this information in advertising to
steal the lead in the market.3' Overseas, offices of U.S. companies
are especially vulnerable to attacks by host governments or foreign
32companies.
Economic espionage is used not only to steal information, but
also to weaken the capabilities and reputation of a competing
company. Hackers are employed to deface or disable web sites,
attack networks, or disrupt programs by adding code; 33 this also
allows competing companies to identify security weaknesses that
are then used to gain access to more sensitive data.34 Despite these
attacks, information losses are not consistently reported to U.S.
federal or state law enforcement agencies. This is primarily due to:
(1) the perception that IP theft is a low priority compared to more
violent crimes; (2) the fear of adverse publicity or a required
disclosure of trade secrets to the defendant; and (3) the desire to
pursue civil remedies.35 Many of these fears are well-founded
because information-loss incidents are difficult to investigate.36
29 Freeh Statement, supra note 9, at 20.
30 Laura Ramsay, Stealing Trade Secrets: When the Cold War Ended, It Didn't End
Spying, Just Shifted Its Focus, NAT'L POST (Canada), Oct. 4, 1999, at C13.
31 Palmer, supra note 23, at 16.
32 Ian Lynch, Overseas Offices Fall Prey to Crackers, Dec. 11, 2000, at
http://www.vnunet.com/News/1 115279.
33 Id. For example, Safeway's online shopping site was hacked to obtain customer
lists, and shoppers were then sent messages encouraging them to shop at other stores.
The message appeared to have been issued by Safeway itself. John O'Reilly, Online
Propaganda the Corporate Way, Nov. 29, 2000, at http://www.vnunet.com/
analysis/ 1114674.
34 Lynch, supra note 32. Economic espionage by cyber attack is a global problem.
"In December [of 2000] alone, websites of car manufacturers BMW (France), Renault
(South Africa), Chevrolet (India and Argentina), [and] Opel (India) [had] all been
defaced ..... Id.
35 ASIS REPORT, supra note 4, at 17.
36 Id. at 19.
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Without complete cooperation of the injured party, trained staff of
both the business and the law enforcement agency, and a timely
response, investigations are severely hindered.37
Nevertheless, the U.S. government and U.S. companies are not
just victims of economic espionage but are actively seeking
proprietary economic information themselves. For example,
Germany is a "crucial field of operations for foreign spies."38
Large German corporations, such as BMW, Siemens, and Dasa,
have been victims of industrial espionage. 39 Enercon, a leading
German manufacturer of wind energy equipment, recently alleged
that the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted
communications regarding its new, cheap method for harnessing
wind power and passed the information to a U.S. competitor that
designed and patented an identical product.4 °
III.U.S. Trade Secret Law
A. Background
Historically, IP rights in the United States were based in
federal patent and copyright protection, with trade secret law
providing protection for "lesser" inventions that were
unpatentable.4 Today, however, businesses are increasingly
relying on trade secret law to protect proprietary information and
new technological creations that are outside the scope of
37 Id.
38 Denis Staunton, Electronic Spies Torture German Firms, IRISH TIMES, Apr. 16,
1999, at 54.
39 Staunton, supra note 38, at 54.
40 Id. German intelligence chiefs in the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg, a major
German industrial center, reported that two-thirds of all foreign espionage in 1997 was
economic espionage. Id.
41 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974) (stating that
trade secret law protects and encourages the development of products of "lesser or
different invention than might be accorded protection under the patent laws, but which
items still have an important part to play in the technological and scientific advancement
of the Nation"). But see J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and
Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2438 (1994) (arguing that legal
theorists have underestimated the significance of trade secrets in intellectual property
law). Information, data, or products may also be protected under the law of patents.
ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 8.02 (2001). The law of patents and
trade secrets overlaps, but offer different levels of protection. Id.
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traditional copyright and patent law.42 The use of trade secrets may
be preferable to patent law because of the shorter life spans of
technology products, the cost and delay in filing and defending
patents, and the inadequacy of patent protection against modem
theft.43 Significantly, federal patent law has recently been amended
to require the public disclosure of pending patent applications
eighteen months after the date they were filed." The essence of
trade secret law is that the trade secret owner, who has worked to
create value in its use, is rewarded with a commercial advantage
over those who have not fairly developed similar knowledge.45 An
individual or corporation maintaining a trade secret benefits from
its rivals' inability to duplicate the secret information, product, or
process.46 Two famous examples include the formula for Coca-
Cola that has been maintained in a bank vault in Atlanta, Georgia
for over 100 years, and the recipe for Kentucky Fried Chicken that
is kept in a secret location under guard.47 Trade secret law also
imposes liability for disclosing or using another's trade secrets.48
42 E.g., Reichman, supra note 41 (arguing modem forms of innovation are not
adaptable to traditional patent and copyright law); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308
(1994) (analyzing why patent and copyright laws are ineffective to protect computer
software programs).
43 Lamb, supra note 8, at 36-38. Companies have turned away from patent
protection because they fear that the information and plans for their products on file with
patent offices will be reviewed and copied by domestic and foreign firms. Id.
Additionally, the life cycle of modern technology is short, rendering the seventeen-year
U.S. protection meaningless. Id. Finally, patents are costly to file and defend and do not
offer protection until they are officially filed, leaving the owner unprotected while an
application is pending. Id.
44 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2001). Although there are exceptions and additional protections
in the new legislation, this new requirement will result in increased disclosure of
information not yet patented. Id.
45 E. I. duPont deNemours & Co., Inc. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971) (stating "[olur tolerance of the espionage
game must cease when the protections required to prevent another's spying cost so much
that the spirit of inventiveness is dampened"); ROBERT C. DORR & CHRISTOPHER H.
MUNCH, PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, AND TRADEMARKS 204
(3d ed. Aspen Publishers, 2000) (1990).
46 Anne Marriott, Companies Gamble on Keeping Secrets, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 20,
1997, at B6.
47 Id.
48 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. c (1939).
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B. The Civil Law of Trade Secrets
The first obstacle in protecting trade secrets is defining what
they are. Until recently, the civil law of trade secrets was based in
common law and equity.49 Many U.S. courts rely on the traditional
definition found in the Restatement (First) of Torts: "[Any]
formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is
used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use
it.''5° The Restatement of Unfair Competition expanded the
definition of trade secrets to include all "economically valuable
information."51 To maintain a common law cause of action in trade
secret law, a plaintiff must show three elements: (1) the existence
of a trade secret; (2) the improper disclosure or use of the trade
secret; and (3) injury to the trade secret owner.5 2 The Restatement
(First) of Torts identified six factors to be considered to determine
whether information qualifies as a trade secret.5 3 No single factor
is determinative, and courts must weigh all factors in their
consideration.54
49 Arthur J. Schwab & David J. Porter, Federal Protection of Trade Secrets:
Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, J. PROPRIETARY RTS., Apr. 1998, at
2,2.
50 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
51 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. d (1995).
52 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 (1995).
53 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). The following was provided as
guidance:
An exact definition of a trade secret is not possible. Some factors to be
considered in determining whether given information is one's trade secret are:
the extent to which the information is known outside of his business; the extent
to which it is known by employees and others involved in his businesses; the
extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of this information; the
value of the information to him and to his competitors; the amount of effort or
money expended by him in developing the information; the ease or difficulty
with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.
Id.
The drafters of the second edition of the Restatement of Torts in 1979 intentionally
omitted any reference to trade secrets, believing the subject matter to be outside
traditional tort law. MILGRIM, supra note 41, § 1.01. Subsequently, courts differed as to
whether trade secrets were covered by the law of torts or the law of unfair competition.
Id. n.4.
54 DEBORAH E. BOUCHOUX, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS,
[Vol. 27
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First, although trade secret owners must protect their
confidential information, courts do not require extreme and unduly
expensive procedures to protect trade secrets against flagrant
industrial espionage.55 In E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v.
Christopher,6 the Fifth Circuit set the standard for later trade
secret protection, requiring "reasonable precautions" rather than an
"impenetrable fortress" against any industrial espionage.57
Although secrecy need not be absolute, the greater the number of
people who know the confidential information, the less likely it is
to be a trade secret.58 Companies may freely disclose confidential
information to their employees who have a "need to know," but
wider dissemination outside the employment relationship may
defeat a trade secret claim.59 Generally, advising employees of the
existence of trade secrets, limiting their access to the information
on a "need to know" basis, and requiring them to sign
confidentiality agreements constitute reasonable efforts to
maintain secrecy.6"
In terms of trade secrets transmitted via e-mail, courts may
require advanced measures such as encryption and authentication
systems to find that a plaintiff reasonably protected his secrets.
61
The posting of a trade secret on the Internet destroys its secrecy
and "prevents [a plaintiff] from further enforcing its trade secret
COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS, AND TRADE SECRETS 342-43 (2000)..
55 E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971) (holding that plaintiff was not required to enclose its
unfinished factory to protect it from defendant's spying through the use of aerial
photography).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 1017.
58 BOUCHOUX, supra note 54, at 342.
59 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584 (1985); Smith v.
Snap-On Tools Corp., 833 F.2d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1987); BOUCHOUX, supra note 54, at
342; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. f (1995). Trade secret
law in the context of the employment relationship and the use of confidential agreements
is not the subject of this Comment.
60 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231,
1254 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding plaintiff employer had made "more than an adequate
showing" of reasonable efforts, citing the company's use of locks and safes, logging and
identifying the trade secret materials, limiting access to the materials, and requiring
confidentiality agreements for all employees with access to the materials).
61 See id. at 1253-56.
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rights in those materials" even if the trade secret was originally
obtained by wrongful means.62 One court has even found that, in
the absence of a confidential relationship or fiduciary duty, a
plaintiff may not enjoin the disclosure of trade secrets on the
Internet by a defendant who did not participate in their
misappropriation.63.
Second, only "valuable" information constitutes a trade
secret.64 To be valuable, a trade secret must not only have value to
its owner, but must also have commercial value to competitors or
others who might benefit from its use.65 Trade secret protection is
afforded to processes and compilations of data as well as to
information and tangible items.66 Courts have found trade secret
rights in a computer software object code,67 detailed bid
information regarding equipment leases, 68  a compilation of
changing retail sales information, 69 and the process for converting
62 Id. at 1256. The court held that the defendant posting the plaintiff's information
on the Internet was liable for misappropriation, but other use of the information was not
actionable because the confidential information had become "generally known" and was
no longer secret. Id. The court noted the danger of the anonymous defendant using the
Internet to permanently destroy valuable trade secrets without an available remedy to the
plaintiff. Id. For a further discussion of Religious Tech. Ctr., see Eugene A. Burcher and
Anna M. Hughes, Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communications
Services, Inc.: Internet Service Providers: The Knowledge Standard for Contributory
Copyright Infringement and The Fair Use Defense, 3 RICH. J.L. & TECH 5 (1997). The
Internet age poses great challenges to protecting proprietary information. See, e.g., Ari B.
Good, Trade Secrets and the New Realities of the Internet Age, 2 MARQ. INTELL. PROP.
L. REV. 51 (1998); Ryan Lambrecht, Trade Secrets and the Internet: What Remedies
Exist for Disclosure in the Information Age?, 18 REV. LITIG. 317 (1999).
63 Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745, 753 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (holding
defendant's improper receipt and disclosure of plaintiffs trade secrets was not grounds
for a prior restraint, which in this case would abridge defendant's rights under the first
amendment).
64 BOUCHOUX, supra note 54, at 343.
65 Diamond v. T. Rowe Price Assoc., 852 F. Supp. 372 (D. Md. 1994) (holding that
evidence failed to show value in trade secret to anyone but owner, so no protection was
available).
66 BOUCHOUX, supra note 54, at 341-42.
67 Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 798 F. Supp. 284 (D. Md. 1992), rev'd
on other grounds, 996 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 965 (1993).
68 Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co., 914 F.2d 556 (4th Cir.
1990), cert denied, 499 U.S. 947, 59 U.S.L.W. 3672 (1991).
69 Lynch, Jones, & Ryan, Inc. v. Standard & Poor's, No. 117064/97, 1998 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 334 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998). Accord Integrated Cash Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v.
[Vol. 27
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wood pulp into paper-even though the elements of that process
were all generally known.7 ° The ease of duplication by legal
means, such as by "reverse engineering,"'" would also make the
original product unworthy of trade secret protection.72 Additional
proper methods of discovering or acquiring a trade secret include
independent invention, licensing from a lawful owner, observation
of the item in public use, or acquisition from published literature.73
C. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act
The evolution of trade secrets under state laws resulted in
inconsistent protection across the United States.74 To harmonize
these state laws, Congress enacted the UTSA in 1979.75 The
UTSA protects information that is not generally known or readily
ascertainable but has independent economic value and is the
subject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy. 76 Like the
Digital Transactions, Inc., 920 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding arrangement of four
non-secret, publicly available computer programs that produced a previously unknown
or used software process was a valuable trade secret).
70 Repap Enters., Inc. v. Kamyr, No. 92-5701, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19524 (E.D.
Pa. 1993).
71 Flotec, Inc., v. S. Research, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1000 (S.D. Ind. 1998). The
court in Flotec stated that, "The process known as 'reverse engineering,' in which a
skilled person studies a product and figures out how to produce it, is permissible and
even encouraged under trade secret law." Id. at 1000 (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974)) (stating trade secret law "does not offer protection
against discovery by fair and honest means, such as by independent invention, accidental
disclosure, or by so-called reverse engineering, that is by starting with the known
product and working backward to divine the process which aided in its development or
manufacture").
72 BOUCHOUX, supra note 54, at 343.
73 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
74 Brandon B. Cate, Saforo & Associates, Inc. v. Porocel Corp.: The Failure of the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act to Clarify the Doubtful and Confused Status of Common Law
Trade Secret Principles, 53 ARK. L. REV. 687, 716 (2000).
75 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 437 (Supp. 2001)
[hereinafter UTSA]. The UTSA was amended in 1985 to clarify ambiguous provisions
and strengthen its regulatory framework. James C. Lydon, The Deterrent Effect of the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 427, 427-28 (1987)
(comparing the differences between the original and the amended UTSA).
76 UTSA § 1(4); BOUCHOUX, supra note 54, at 343. The UTSA defines trade
secrets as follows:
"Trade Secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation,
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 27
Restatement, liability under the UTSA requires the existence of a
trade secret and its misappropriation by "improper means. 77
Misappropriation can occur by unlawfully acquiring a trade secret
or by the improper use or disclosure of a lawfully acquired trade
secret, which are considered two separate causes of action.7 8 Third
parties are liable for acquiring a trade secret, regardless of whether
they actually used or disclosed the information, if they knew or
had reason to know the information was acquired through
unlawful means.79 Misappropriation by use or disclosure is
actionable if the data was acquired in the context of a confidential
relationship, such as employment,8 ° or through other improper
means.
81
program, device, method, technique, or process that: (i) derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known, and not
being readily ascertainable by proper means by other persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that
are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
UTSA § 1(4).
The UTSA definition is broader than that of the RESTATEMENT because it includes
information such as programs, methods, and techniques and it does not require, as does
the Restatement, that information be in "continuous use in the operation of the business."
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). Compare id. with UTSA § 1(4). Accord
Phillips v. Frey, 20 F.3d 623 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding method of manufacturing and
marketing plaintiffs hunting stand was a valuable trade secret that defendant
misappropriated).
77 UTSA § 1(1). While the UTSA does not provide an exhaustive list of "improper
means," it sets forth examples including: "theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or
inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or
other means." Id.
78 UTSA § 1(2). The misappropriation of a trade secret occurs when a person or
entity discloses or uses a trade secret owned by another without that party's consent, uses
improper means to gain knowledge of the secret, knew or should have known the trade
secret was acquired by improper means, or knew or should have known that the trade
secret was acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy. Id.
Contra Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d at 753 (imposing no liability under the Michigan
Trade Secrets Act for defendant's improper disclosure on the Internet of trade secrets he
knew to be illegally obtained).
79 UTSA § 1(2)(i). Even if a trade secret were inadvertently acquired by a third
party, that party would be liable if, before materially altering its position, it had actual or
constructive knowledge of the trade secret and that its acquisition was a mistake. UTSA
§ 1(2)(ii)(C).
80 UTSA § l(2)(ii)(B)(II).
81 UTSA § 1(2)(ii)(A).
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Since 1979, forty-two states and the District of Columbia have
adopted the UTSA.82 Even in these jurisdictions, however, the
UTSA was modified prior to enactment, perpetuating inconsistent
enforcement of trade secret law.83 The lack of uniformity in civil
state trade secret law has had serious consequences. First, the
nature of trade secrets and the injuries from their misappropriation
result in a choice of law problem.' 4 In trade secret cases, it is
difficult to ascertain where the injury or the act of
misappropriation took place; the plaintiffs development and
safeguarding of a trade secret often occur in a different jurisdiction
from where the defendant allegedly improperly acquired, used, or
disclosed the information." The inconsistent application of trade
secret protection also requires a national company with offices in
multiple jurisdictions to enact the most restrictive and expensive
confidentiality program to maintain its trade secrets.86 The choice
of law problem is exacerbated where the parties are foreign
companies and foreign trade secret laws are implicated. In BP
Chemicals Ltd. v. Formosa Chemical & Fibre Corp.,87 a
Taiwanese exporter of rayon and fiber contracted with a New
Jersey company to fabricate certain chemical process vessels and
82 Marina Lao, Federalizing Trade Secrets Law in an Information Economy, 59
OHIO ST. L. J. 1633, 1657 n. 143 (1998).
83 Id. at 1649. For example, the North Carolina Trade Secrets Act differs
substantially from the UTSA. Id. at 1650 n.100; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66.152-58 (1999).
84 Choice of law rules of a jurisdiction may require that it apply the substantive law
of another state to the claim. RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 262 (2d ed. 1997).
85 See Lao, supra note 82, at 1672. The author's hypothetical is instructive. She
states:
For example, where the plaintiff was headquartered in Minnesota and had an
office in Ohio (where the trade secret was developed and located), and where
the defendant improperly used plaintiff's trade secret in New York, it is not
clear whether plaintiff was injured in Minnesota, Ohio, or New York, or
perhaps all three states.
Id. Similarly, the planning and act of misappropriation may invoke the jurisdiction of
several different states. Id. For a full discussion of the issues of jurisdiction and choice of
law with IP right, see John N. Adams, Industrial Property in a Globalized Environment:
Issues of Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND THE COMMON LAW WORLD 251 (Charles E. F. Rickett & Graeme W. Austin eds.,
2000).
86 Lao, supra note 82, at 1673.
87 229 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2000).
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heat exchangers for use in the construction of an acetic plant.88
Subsequently, a British company filed suit claiming that the
Taiwanese company misappropriated trade secrets relating to the
process for making acetic acid by copying elements of a plant
design.89 The Third Circuit ultimately held that a state's interest in
protecting its citizens' IP did not outweigh the interests of a
foreign sovereign in establishing IP standards within its own
borders. 9° The court reached its holding only after determining
where the alleged injury occurred and which of the laws of the
three jurisdictions should govern the dispute.9'
The inconsistent protection of trade secrets may also violate
U.S. treaty commitments. States that have adopted substantially
modified provisions of the UTSA or that continue to apply
Restatement rules may not meet the minimum standards for trade
secret protection in multilateral treaties to which the United States
is a party.92 Further, the lack of federal civil protection for trade
secrets may indicate to foreign nations that such protection is not a
U.S. priority and may undermine U.S. efforts to promote stronger
trade secret laws internationally. 93 Therefore, adherence to a
uniform federal law, such as the UTSA, is necessary to provide
consistent trade secret protection domestically and to further our
interests and honor our commitments to protect IP
internationally.94
D. The Criminal Law of Trade Secrets
Prior to 1996, existing criminal statutes indirectly punished
88 Id. at 257.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 268.
91 Id. at 264-67.
92 See Lao, supra note 82, at 1677. The trade secret provisions of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) were based on the UTSA and are
generally consistent with its provisions. Like the UTSA, NAFTA and TRIPS contain no
requirement for the continuous use of a trade secret in one's business as required by the
Restatement. Id. On TRIPS and NAFTA, see infra notes 169-175, 180-186,
respectively, and accompanying text.
93 See Lao, supra note 82, at 1679.
94 Id.; Cate, supra note 74, at 716.
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trade secret theft. The National Stolen Property Act (NSPA)95
prohibits the theft of tangible property containing trade secrets
including documents or computer disks that are transported across
state lines.96 A violation of the NSPA is not proven by the mere
existence of a stolen trade secret in a state or country other than its
original location; rather the prosecution must prove the item was
physically transported and that the defendant knew the items were
stolen.97 The government's inability to prove these statutory
elements resulted in ineffective trade secret prosecution under the
NSPA.98
The mail and wire fraud statutes were also used to prosecute
the misappropriation of proprietary information.99 Unlike the
NSPA, these fraud statutes are applicable to the theft of intangible
rights, and they do not require proof that the defendant benefited
from his crime." These statutes, however, are only applicable to
trade secret theft through the use of the mail or wire services.10
Thus far, federal statutes have been generally ineffective at
deterring industrial espionage and trade secret theft.
E. The Economic Espionage Act
The EEA °2 is the first federal criminal law to protect trade
secrets. Noting that foreign governments had redirected their
espionage infrastructures at U.S. industry, the EEA was primarily
designed to halt foreign espionage.' °3 The EEA, however, applies
95 National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1994) [hereinafter NSPA]. The
NSPA provides criminal sanctions for any individual who "transports, transmits, or
transfers in interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or
money of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, converted
or taken by fraud ..... Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 See United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding the theft of
tangible items was an essential element of the statute, and holding NSPA inapplicable
due to prosecution's inability to prove a physical theft of computer programs).
99 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346 (1993).
100 See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
101 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346 (1993).
102 Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (Supp. V 1999)
[hereinafter EEA].
103 18 U.S.C. § 1831. The statute prohibits theft of trade secrets by any individual
2001]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 27
equally to the domestic theft of trade secrets. 04 The EEA was
developed from existing civil trade secret law, and it is both more
expansive and narrower in scope than the UTSA.' °5 The EEA
generally defines "trade secret" as all forms of business
information that an owner has taken "reasonable measures" to
keep secret that are not "generally known" or "readily
ascertainable" by the public.° 6 Similar to the UTSA, the extent of
trade secret protection must be reasonable under the
circumstances.'0 7 The EEA, however, more broadly defines the
terms constituting trade secrets by expressly protecting intangible
information and by protecting information regardless of how it is
stored.10 8 Another expansive feature of the EEA is § 1837, which
extends criminal punishment to conduct overseas if the defendant
charged is bound by U.S. federal law or if "an act in furtherance of
the offense was committed in the United States."' 0 9 This provision
extends the jurisdictional reach of the U.S. Government to all U.S.
citizens and corporations overseas and allows the United States to
pursue trade secret theft abroad, so long as some part of the
criminal activity is connected to the United States. 0
"intending or knowing that the offense will benefit any foreign government, foreign
instrumentality, or foreign agent." Id. § 1831(a); See also 142 CONG. REc. S12,201
(daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kohl).
104 18 U.S.C. § 1832.
105 Compare UTSA § 1(4), with EEA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839.
106 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A)-(B). The Act provides a non-exhaustive list of types of
"trade secrets" to guide those applying the statute. "[T]he term 'trade secret' means all
forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering
information, including patterns, plans, compilations .... programs, or codes, whether
tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically,
electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing." Id. § 1839(3).
107 Id. § 1839. See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l v. Holden Found. Seeds, 35 F.3d 1226,
1235 (8th Cir. 1994).
108 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3); Schwab & Porter, supra note 49 at 2, 3-4.
109 18 U.S.C. § 1837(1)-(2) (1996). The Act applies to conduct proscribed in § 1831
if the act occurs outside the United States and:
(1) the offender is a natural person who is a citizen or permanent resident alien
of the United States, or an organization organized under the laws of the United
States or a State or political subdivision thereof; or (2) [if] an act in furtherance
of the offense was committed in the United States.
Id.
110 See id.
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In some respects, however, the EEA is more limited than the
UTSA. The EEA only criminalizes the theft of trade secrets in or
related to products "produced for or placed in interstate or foreign
commerce. .. .""' Moreover, the EEA only punishes intentional or
knowing violations. Section 1831, which prohibits foreign
espionage, requires that the actor intend or know the offense will
benefit a foreign government or agent. 12 Similarly, § 1832
punishes only the actor who "with 'intent' to convert a trade
secret," "intending or knowing that the offense will, injure the
owner," "knowingly" misappropriates the trade secret by various
acts of theft. 1
13
In terms of punishment and sentencing, individuals convicted
of economic espionage under § 1831 are subject to maximum
penalties of fifteen years in prison and fines of $500,000."l4 Any
organization found guilty under § 1831 "shall be fined not more
than $10,000,000."". The EEA provides that individuals convicted
of trade secret theft under § 1832 will be "fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.""' 6 For organizations,
§ 1832 sets a maximum penalty of $5,000,000."' In § 1834, the
EEA also provides for the criminal forfeiture of any property taken
in violation of the Act,"' or of any goods or property used to
"' 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (emphasis added). It has been argued that this requirement
may not protect a great body of valuable industrial information such as customer lists
and the sources of raw materials. Joel M. Androphy et al., Criminal Prosecutions of
Trade Secret Theft: The Emergence of the Economic Espionage Act, 38 Hous. LAW. 16,
17 (2000).
112 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a).
113 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a). The government must establish three elements to prove its
case. First, it must show the defendant intended to convert a trade secret and establish
that the proprietary information constitutes a trade secret. Second, the government must
show the defendant intended or knew that his conduct would injure the trade secret
owner. The Act does not require the government to prove the defendant acted with
malice or evil intent. Third, the government must show the defendant to have actual
knowledge or belief to a substantial certainty that the information he is misappropriating
is a trade secret. Ignorance, mistake, or accident are insufficient to prove knowledge
under this element. ld; Androphy et al., supra note 111, at 17.
114 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a).
115 Id. § 1831(b).
116 Id. § 1832(a).
117 Id. § 1832(b).
118 Id. § 1834(a)(1).
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commit a violation of the Act. " 9 Although the EEA provides stiff
penalties for IP crimes, sentencing has resulted in large monetary
fines but limited prison sentences. 120 Furthermore, the government
has only used the criminal forfeiture option provided in § 1834 in
three cases. '21
To date, the government has brought only eighteen cases under
the EEA against defendant individuals and corporations. 122 The
dearth of prosecutions to date may have resulted from intentional
selectivity by the government seeking to prosecute only clear
cases of theft123 or, more likely, from inherent government and
private sector limits on the EEA's effectiveness. 124 Of note,
119 Id. § 1834(a)(2).
120 Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, Department of Justice,
Economic Espionage Act Case Summaries [hereinafter EEA Case Summaries], at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/eeapub.htm (updated Oct. 5, 2001). While
most convicted criminal defendants have received limited prison terms or probation, one
defendant was sentenced to prison for fifty-four months, and another defendant was
sentenced to prison for seventy-seven months. Id. The light sentences for defendants
convicted under the EEA are likely due, in part, to the frequency of guilty pleas by
defendants seeking reduced prison terms. See id. C.f. Chris Carr et al., The Economic
Espionage Act: Bear Trap or Mousetrap?, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 159, 198 (2000)
(noting that in several trade secret cases the government linked charges under EEA with
other federal statutes "upping the ante" for defendants wishing to go to trial and
encouraging them to plead guilty to lesser charges).
121 Carr et al., supra note 120, at 198.
122 Id. at 196.
123 Joseph N. Hosteny, The Economic Espionage Act: A Very Mixed Blessing,
INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Feb. 1998, at 129, LEXIS, News Library, Intellectual Property
Today (stating "the EEA is going to be selectively applied, at least for some time to
come"). In many cases, the government waits to bring cases where a defendant's
criminal intent and knowledge are clear so that there is a high probability of conviction.
Id.
124 See Kent B. Alexander & Kristen L. Wood, The Economic Espionage Act:
Setting the Stage for a New Commercial Code of Conduct, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 907
(1999). Government impediments to greater effectiveness include: prosecutors who are
ill-prepared to prove the victim's reasonable protection of trade secrets given their
experience only in proving the criminality of a defendant's conduct; the extremely
technical nature of trade secret cases, which are difficult for prosecutors to prepare and
too complicated for juries to comprehend; and the lower priority of trade secret thefts, as
a white-collar crime, compared to more violent crimes. Id. at 930-31. Private sector
impediments include: the unwillingness of businesses to report violations for fear of
required disclosure of trade secrets at trial; the inability of a victim in a criminal case to
direct the litigation; the fear of discovery of misconduct by the defendant corporation;
and the fear of bad publicity that can negatively affect public relations and advertising of
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although many of the cases involve foreign nationals and
businesses, the government has yet to bring charges for foreign
espionage under § 1831.125 In general, EEA cases have included
FBI undercover operations with recorded conversations to prove
the necessary mens rea of the crime, and they have involved
contractors, consultants, and former employees as defendants.'26
All EEA cases have involved the theft of valuable trade secrets,
including designs for a coal-mining machine, 127 a Deloitte &
Touche software program,"' CISCO optical networking
software, 129 and the productdesign for the Gillette Company's new
shaving system.
131
In United States v. Pin Yen Yang, 131 the government brought
one of the first EEA cases against foreign defendants. 132 In Yang, a
Taiwanese businessman, his daughter, and his "Four Pillars"
the company's products. Id. at 933-34. But see Dennis J. Kelly & Paul R. Mastrocola,
The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 27 NEw. ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
181, 190-91 (2000) (noting that despite disadvantages to pursuing criminal, rather than
civil, claims, U.S. companies, especially smaller victim companies or larger companies
with cases against "judgment-proof' civil defendants, will prefer to use the powers and
resources of the federal government).
125 Carr et al., supra note 120, at 198.
126 EEA Case Summaries, supra note 120; Alexander & Wood, supra note 124, at
928.
127 See United States v. Fulton, No. 98-CR-059 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 1998). For a
discussion of this case, see Mark D. Seltzer & Angela A. Burns, Criminal Consequences
of Trade Secret Misappropriation: Does the Economic Espionage Act Insulate Trade
Secrets from Theft and Render Civil Remedies Obsolete?, 1999 B.C. INTELL. PROP. &
TECH. F. 052501, 75 (1999), at http://infoeagle.bc.edu/bc-org/avp/law/st-org/
iptf/articles/index.html.
128 See Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Texan Pleads Guilty to Stealing
Trade Secrets from Employer, ICS, Deloitte-Touche, at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/
cybercrime/trujillo.htm (July 30, 1998).
129 See Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, San Francisco Man Arrested on
Charges of Trade Secrets Theft, at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/morch.htm
(November 21, 2000). As of Aug. 22, 2001, no further action in the case has been
reported. EEA Case Summaries, supra note 120.
130 See Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Stephen Davis Pleads Guilty to
Theft of Gillette Trade Secrets, at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/Davis
Plea.htm (Jan. 27, 1998).
131 74 F. Supp. 2d 724 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
132 Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Four Pillars, P.Y. Yang and Sally
Yang Convicted of Violating the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/avery.htm (Apr. 28, 1999).
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company were convicted of stealing Avery-Dennison
Corporation's self-adhesive products and marketing them in
Asia;'33 the loss of these products was estimated at $50-60
million.
134
In December 1999, two individual defendants and three
corporate defendants pled guilty and were sentenced to prison
terms and fines totaling approximately $19 million.3 5 The founder
of the three defendant corporations admitted stealing designs of
machinery systems for the production and transmission of crude
oil, manufacturing identical products, and selling these products
overseas, including to an Iranian businessman in Sweden. 13 6
Although charged under § 1832, the harmful impact of trade secret
crime in both Yang and the December 1999 pleas was not limited
to the loss of valuable information by the victim corporation.
These actions may also have directly supported foreign nations
competing with U.S. industry.13
7
In United States v. Hsu,138one of the few reported cases under
the EEA, the defendant, a technical director for a Taiwanese
corporation, and Chester S. Ho, a biochemist and professor at
National Chiao Tung University in Taiwan, were arrested for
conspiring to steal trade secrets after a two-year FBI
investigation.139 Hsu solicited executives of Bristol-Myers Squib
Corporation who were posing as corrupt scientists trying to steal
the formula for Taxol, a highly valuable anti-cancer drug.14°
133 Yang, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 726.
134 Id. (noting that the defendants in Yang were continually supplied with
proprietary information by an Avery-Dennison employee who acted as a "consultant" for
Four Pillars for eight years).
135 Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, International Economic Espionage
Defendants Sentenced, at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/tejassen.htm (June
15, 2000).
136 Id.
137 In 1999, an employee was arrested for stealing 3Com computer software codes
while waiting to board a flight to Seoul, South Korea. Carr et al., supra note 120, at 194-
95 (citing United States v. Eun Joong Kim, Criminal Case No. 99-CR-481 (N.D. Ill.,
filed July 1, 1999)). The theft and disclosure of this valuable information would have
been devastating and, like any loss by a large company, would have negatively affected
the U.S. economy. See id. at 161-62.
138 155 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1998).
139 Id. at 191-93.
140 Id. at 192.
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Although the defendants were foreign nationals, they were
charged under § 1832, the domestic provision of the law.'41
Charges against Ho were eventually dismissed, but Hsu pled guilty
and was sentenced to time served (two years) and a $10,000
fine. 14
2
The Hsu decision is important because it established standards
for future EEA cases. Protection of a plaintiff's trade secret during
a prosecution under EEA has been a major concern for trade secret
owners.'143 Section 1835 allows courts to use their discretion to
protect proprietary information. 144 In Hsu, the Third Circuit sought
to balance the competing interests of a defendant's right to
discovery and the victim's right to maintain the confidentiality of
trade secrets. "' 5 The Third Circuit reversed the district court's
ruling allowing discovery of the trade secrets and remanded the
case for an in camera examination by the trial court to determine
whether Taxol was, indeed, a trade secret. 146 The Third Circuit
held that the charges of conspiracy and attempt to steal trade
secrets did not require a defendant's actual possession of the trade
secret to prepare a defense. 14' This ruling helped to allay long-held
concerns that a victim of trade secret theft would be required to
disclose the confidential information he sought to protect, thus
defeating the main purpose of the EEA. 14  Nevertheless, the
continuing fear of disclosure of confidential information at trial
may inhibit companies from reporting theft to U.S. law
enforcement. 14
9
141 See id. at 197.
142 Espionage Charges are Dropped Against Biochemist, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1999,
atB5.
143 E.g., Susan V. Metcalfe, Protecting Trade Secrets: Is the Remedy Worse than the
Wrong?, 104 DICK. L. REV. 503 (2000).
144 18 U.S.C. § 1835 (Supp. V 1999) ("in any prosecution or other proceeding under
this chapter, the court shall enter such orders and take such other action as may be
necessary and appropriate to preserve the confidentiality of trade secrets").
145 Hsu, 155 F.3d at 204-06.
146 Id. at 205-06.
147 Id. at 204.
148 See, e.g., Allyson A. McKenzie, United States v. Kai-Lo Hsu: An Examination
of the Confidentiality Provisions in the Economic Espionage Act: Is it Suitable to
Maintain the Use and Effectiveness of the EEA ?, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 309, 312 (2000).
149 Id. For a discussion of how trade secrets are generally protected in the discovery
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Courts applying the EEA have also had difficulty interpreting
the vague language of the Act. In Hsu, on remand, the District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania struggled with the
concept of information that was "generally known" and "readily
ascertainable" and therefore employed its own bio-technical
experts to determine what information constituted trade secrets.1 50
The four experts disagreed as to what information should be
protected and what information was generally known to the
public. "5 ' The defendants in Hsu also unsuccessfully raised the
defense that the statute was "void for vagueness" based on these
terms.152 Although there was sufficient evidence to prove the Hsu
defendants were knowingly attempting to steal a trade secret, in
subsequent cases, where a defendant's knowledge is less certain,
prosecutors will likely face similar challenges concerning the
vagueness of the act.153
Therefore, trade secret protection in the United States is well
established and has been enhanced by enactment of the UTSA and
the EEA. Nevertheless, the inconsistency in state criminal law
was, and is, an impediment to further protection of trade secrets
and to greater international cooperation in this area. 5 4 Although
phase of civil and criminal cases, see Metcalfe, supra note 143.
150 United States v. Hsu, 40 F. Supp. 2d 623, 628-29 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
151 Id. at 629. The four scientists disagreed as to the number of pages to be redacted
to protect trade secrets, with two scientists finding that more than one hundred of the
pages redacted by the other two scientists contained public information that should not
have been redacted. Id.
152 Id. at 626.
153 Robin D. Ryan, The Criminalization of Trade Secret Theft Under the Economic
Espionage Act of 1996: An Evaluation of United States v. Hsu, 40 F. Supp. 2d 623 (E.D.
Pa. 1999), 25 DAYTON L. REv. 243 (2000). The author notes that in cases involving a
completed theft, in which a defendant's knowledge that he is committing a crime is
insufficient to establish guilt, courts may be required to evaluate the vague terms of the
EEA. Id. at 260. "The void for vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute Jefine the
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
154 As of Spring 1999, "only thirty states [had] criminal laws addressing the theft
and misappropriation of trade secrets." Christopher A. Ruhl, Corporate and Economic
Espionage: A Model Penal Approach for Legal Deterrence to Theft of Corporate Trade
Secrets and Proprietary Business Information, 33 VAL. U. L. REv. 763, 788-89 (1999)
(proposing a model criminal penal code, based on the EEA, in order to protect trade
secrets). Like state enactment of civil trade secret law, the state criminal statutes vary
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lack of uniform application and use impedes the effectiveness of
both laws, they are models for greater trade secret cooperation
internationally. 155
IV. International Cooperation to Protect Trade Secrets
The global development of IP is increasing dramatically.
Information and communication technology is projected to surpass
$3 trillion by 2004.156 Nevertheless, IP protections, especially with
regard to trade secret law, are not well established. Unlike patents
and copyrights, trade secrets are not uniformly protected around
the world.'57 While trade secret protection is well established in
many common law countries, such as the United Kingdom and
parts of the British Commonwealth, such as Australia, trade
secrets are not recognized in many countries due to cultural
attitudes regarding ownership and use of valuable business
information."' The nature and extent of protection is also
inconsistently applied in countries that have statutory or common
greatly in terms of scope, coverage, penalties, and their prohibitions on transfer of trade
secrets. Id. at 798. The majority of state criminal statutes inadequately define trade
secrets, exclude information deserving protection, and inadequately proscribe non-
physical methods of theft, such as via memorization or transfer by computer. Id. at 799-
801. Contra Michael Coblenz, Intellectual Property Crimes, 9 ALB. L.J. Sc. & TECH.
235, 315 (1999) (arguing that increased legislation does not increase protection, and
what is required is enhanced investigations, enforcement, and prosecution of existing
laws).
155 See Ruhl, supra note 154, at 788-89.
156 World Information Technology and Services Alliance (WITSA), Digital Planet
2000: The Global Information Economy, at http://www.WITSA.org/ DP2000sum.pdf
(Nov. 2000).
157 JERRY COHEN & ALAN S. GUTrERMAN, TRADE SECRETS PROTECTION AND
EXPLOITATION 409 (1998). Countries that do not explicitly protect trade secrets and
confidential information are: Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Venezuela. Id.
Some form of trade secret protection is available in Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil,
Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India,
Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Peru, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand,
Trinidad, the United Kingdom, and Uruguay. Id. at 413-14.
158 Id. at 410. In some Asian countries, assignments of inventions and nondisclosure
agreements are rare because employees do not expect to transfer ownership to their
employers. Id. at 410 n.3. Brazil and Mexico have statutes that specifically recognize an
employee's right to choose employment including the right to use techniques and
information acquired at work. Id. at 410 n.3, n.5.
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law trade secret remedies.15 9 For example, some countries do not
protect non-industrial trade secrets such as computer programs or
software, 6 ° while others provide less protection for commercial
information, such as consumer lists. 161
A. Multilateral Protection
Despite inconsistent national laws, the emerging multilateral
regime to safeguard IP includes efforts to protect trade secrets.
162
1. The Paris Convention
The Paris Convention 16 was the first international agreement
protecting IP and focused on industrial property.'64 The Paris
Convention requires signatory nations to extend to foreign
nationals the same IP protections that are provided to their own
citizens. 165 Although the Paris Convention continues to ensure that
nations consistently enforce IP rights within their own borders, it
permits and perpetuates weak national laws. 166 Furthermore, the
Paris Convention does not specifically address economic
espionage. Article 10 on unfair competition only prohibits "[alny
act of competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or
commercial matters.' ' 167 The Paris Convention was designed to be
flexible and allow signatory countries to have discretion in
implementing national legislation; however, this has been
ineffective in deterring economic espionage. 1
68
159 Id. at411.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 BOUCHOUX, supra note 54, at 439.
163 Paris Convention of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828
U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
164 Id., 21 U.S.T. at 1630, 828 U.N.T.S. at 307.
165 Id., 21 U.S.T. at 1631, 828 U.N.T.S. at 313.
166 Robert J. Gutowski, The Marriage of Intellectual Property and International
Trade in the TRIPS Agreement: Strange Bedfellows or a Match Made in Heaven?, 47
BuFF. L. REv. 713, 719-20 (1999). The Paris Convention allows nations with weak IP
laws to extend the same weak protection to foreign companies. Id.
167 Paris Convention, supra note 163, 21 U.S.T. at 1648, 828 U.N.T.S. at 337.
168 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Intellectual Property Challenges in the Next
Century: Article an Alert to the Intellectual Property Bar: The Hague Judgments
Convention, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 421, 423 (2001).
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2. The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Agreement
The most extensive multilateral protection of IP was
established by the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Agreement (TRIPS Agreement).1 69 The TRIPS Agreement was
adopted in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations170 in 1993. It requires member countries to protect
against acquisition, disclosure, or use of an individual party's
undisclosed information. 7' Although the language in the TRIPS
Agreement refers to "confidential information," its definition is
consistent with that of trade secrets. Specifically, the TRIPS
Agreement protects information having commercial value, not in
the "public domain," whose owner has taken "reasonable steps" to
maintain its secrecy. 172 The TRIPS Agreement also protects trade
secrets, not as individual IP, but as a prohibition against unfair
competition. 173 The TRIPS Agreement also enhances IP rights
through enforcement mechanisms and remedies including a
required recognition of third-party liability. 174 Nevertheless, the
TRIPS agreement provides a broad exception, permitting members
to adopt contrary national laws if necessary to protect "sectors of
169 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The
Uruguay Round): Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement].
170 Michael L. Doane, The Uruguay Round Negotiations, in INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 274, 274-75 (Anthony D'Amato & Doris Estelle Long
eds., 1997).
171 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 169, art. 39.
172 Id. art. 39(2).
173 Jacques Combeau, Protection of Undisclosed Information, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY & INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND TRIPS
AGREEMENT 58 (Tania Saulnier et al. eds., 1996).
174 Id.; German Cavalier, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND
TRIPS AGREEMENT, supra note 173, at 65. The World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement governs the settlement of disputes, and all trade agreements concluded as
part of the Uruguay Round, including TRIPS, are annexed to it. Thomas Pletscher, Basic
Principles: Acquisition and Maintenance of Rights: Transitional Arrangements, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND
TRIPS AGREEMENT 15, supra note 173, at 18. See generally MILGRIM, supra note 41, §
9.08 (providing information as to how the WTO decides disputes).
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vital importance to their socio-economic and technological
development ....",,'7 This exception may allow countries to avoid
specific prohibitions against economic espionage that are not
specifically forbidden by the agreement.
3. The World Intellectual Property Organization
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is a
global organization established in 1967 to administer several
international treaties regarding IP, including the Paris
Convention.176 WIPO's purpose is to foster cooperation among
states regarding IP, to encourage creative inventions and designs,
and to modernize the administration and protection of industrial
property and lIP. 177 As of March 2001, 177 countries belonged to
WIPO.178 The WIPO Convention defines IP broadly to include
rights related to any inventions, industrial property and designs,
protection against unfair competition, and "all other rights
resulting from intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific,
literary or artistic fields."' 1
79
4. The North American Free Trade Agreement
Another significant multilateral treaty protecting trade secrets
is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between
175 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 169, art. 8.1.
176 INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 561 (Marshall A. Leaffer
ed., BNA Inc. 2d ed. 1997). WIPO also administers the following international
agreements: the Madrid Protocol "for the international registration of marks"; the Madrid
Agreement "for the repression of false and deceptive indications of source on goods";
the Patent Cooperation Treaty Union for the protection of inventions when patent rights
are sought in multiple countries; the Berne Convention "for the protection of literary and
artistic works"; the Rome Convention "for the protection of performers, producers of
phonograms and broadcasting organizations"; the Washington Treaty on intellectual
property related to integrated circuits; and the International Union for the Protection of
New Varieties of Plants. Laurinda Hicks & James R. Holbein, Convergence of National
Intellectual Property Norms in International Trading Agreements, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L. L.
& POL'Y 769, 781 (1997).
177 Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 829 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter WIPO Convention], available at
http://www.WIPO.org/members/convention/conl.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2001).
178 Member States are listed at http://www.WIPO.org/members/index.html.
179 WIPO Convention, supra note 177, art. 2.
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the United States, Canada, and Mexico. 8 ' NAFTA, which entered
into effect on January 1, 1994, is significant because it is the first
international agreement to expressly provide protection for trade
secrets.18' Under Article 1711, trade secret protection of parties is
perpetual, as long as the information remains secret and unknown
to the general public. 8 2 NAFTA also requires the U.S. government
to maintain the secrecy of confidential data submitted for product
approval.'83 This important provision helps to close a source of
information to foreign governments and industrial spies who
previously could mine U.S. government reports and administrative
records for product information. 84 However, the agreement is not
without its flaws. Under NAFTA, a misappropriation of
proprietary information is only actionable if the acquiring party
knew, or was grossly negligent in failing to know, its actions were
illegal;'85 this is a higher standard than the requirement under U.S.
tort law that a plaintiff prove a defendant's knowledge or
constructive knowledge. 1
86
B. The Anti-Bribery Conventions
Bribery of employees or government officials is a common
form of economic espionage.' 87 Thus, public corruption and
180 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 612
[hereinafter NAFTA]. Approved by Congress on Dec. 8, 1993. 19 U.S.C. § 33 11(a).
181 NAFTA, supra note 180, art. 1711; MILGRIM, supra note 41, § 9.07. To ensure
that the United States would not use compliance with IP laws as an excuse to restrict
Canadian imports, Canada insisted that NAFTA contain "a warning" that IP rights would
not themselves become a barrier to trade. NAFTA, supra note 180, art. 1701; Donald E.
deKeiffer, U.S. Trade Policy Regarding Intellectual Property Matters, in
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 106 (George W. Stewart et al.
eds., 1994).
182 NAFTA, supra note 180, art. 1711. Article 1711 offers protection for
information or matters based on their relative, rather than absolute, secrecy, if their
combination is not generally known, even if individual parts are publicly available, and
if the information has actual or potential value. Id.
183 Id.
184 See id.
185 NAFTA, supra note 180, art. 1721.
186 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
187 Palmer, supra note 23, at 16. Bribery is a primary form of trade secret theft
where disaffected or low-paid staff members are vulnerable to bribes of up to a full
year's salary for trash or material containing trade secrets. Id.
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bribery laws have a large impact in deterring trade secret theft. 188
Recently, multilateral efforts have sought to discourage this long-
standing practice in the international community. The Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions (OECD Convention)189 became effective in
February of 1999. This multinational treaty, which was formulated
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) 190 obligates signatory countries to make bribery of foreign
public officials a criminal act.1 91 The U.S. Congress ratified and
implemented the OECD Convention by adopting amendments to
the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 92 Although there are
inherent deficiencies within the OECD Convention and its
188 See id.
189 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1, available at http://www.oecd.org/
daf/nocorruption/20nov I e.htm [hereinafter OECD Convention].
190 The OECD is a Paris-based multilateral organization founded in 1960 with an
annual budget of approximately $ 200 million. It consists of thirty member countries that
together produce two-thirds of the world's goods and services and includes the home
countries of almost all large multinational enterprises. OECD, About OECD, at
http://www.oecd.org/oecd/pages/home/displaygeneral/0,3380,EN-about-0-nodirectorate-
no-no-no-0,FF.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2001).
191 OECD Convention, supra note 189. E.g., Barbara Crutchfield George et al., The
1998 OECD Convention: An Impetus for Worldwide Changes in Attitudes Toward
Corruption in Business Transactions, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 485 (2000). Currently, thirty-four
countries have signed the Convention and implemented national legislation. These
countries include: Argentina (Feb. 8, 2001); Australia (Oct. 18 1999); Austria (May 20,
1999); Belgium (July 27, 1999); Brazil (Aug. 24, 2000); Bulgaria (Dec. 22, 1998);
Canada (Dec. 17, 1998); Chile (Apr. 18, 2001); Czech Republic (Jan. 21, 2000);
Denmark (Sept. 5, 2000); Finland (Dec. 10, 1998); France (July 31, 2000); Germany
(Nov. 10, 1998); Greece (Feb. 5, 1999); Hungary (Dec. 4, 1998); Iceland (Aug. 17,
1998); Ireland (signed, but has not ratified); Italy (Dec. 15, 2000); Japan (Oct. 13, 1998);
Korea (Jan. 4, 1999); Luxembourg (Mar. 21, 2001); Mexico (May 27, 1999); The
Netherlands (Jan. 12, 2001); New Zealand (signed, but has not ratified); Norway (Dec.
18, 1998); Poland (Sept. 8, 2000); Portugal (Nov. 23, 2000); Slovak Republic (Sept. 24,
1999); Spain (Jan. 14, 2000); Sweden (June 8, 1999); Switzerland (May 31, 2000);
Turkey (July 26, 2000); United Kingdom (Dec. 14, 1998); United States (Dec. 8, 1998).
Signature dates available at http://www.oecd.org/oecd/pages/home/displaygeneral/
0,3380,EN-document-88-3-no-6-7534-88,FF.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2001).
192 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, tit. I, 91 Stat. 1494
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). This Act was amended by the
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112
Stat. 3302 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 to dd-2 (1998)).
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implementation in many countries,'93 these international and
national prohibitions against bribery discourage a favorite method
of illegally acquiring trade secrets.
On November 4, 1998, the Council of Europe (COE) adopted
the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, which becomes
effective upon ratification by fourteen participating nations.'94 The
Convention on Corruption seeks to criminalize various corrupt
practices, including active and passive bribery in both the private
and public sectors, and to increase international cooperation in the
prosecution of such offenses.195 As of March 3, 2001, nine
member states had ratified the treaty.' 96 While a step in the right
direction, the Convention on Corruption allows for circumvention
of its prohibitions through declarations or reservations. 97
V. Trade Secret Law in the EU and the War of Economic
Espionage
A. Trade Secret Law in the European Union
1. Background
The EU is one of the largest trading partners of the United
States, and the EU's IP laws directly impact the U.S. market.' 98
The EU evolved from the Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community (Rome Treaty),' 99 which was enacted on
193 George et al., supra note 191, at 515-18.
194 Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention, Jan. 27, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 505
[hereinafter Convention on Corruption], available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/
en/Treaties/Html/173.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2001).
195 Id.
196 Current nations ratifying the Convention on Corruption are available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/CadreListeTraites.htm.
197 Convention on Corruption, supra note 194, art. 36. Signatories are allowed to
declare that bribery of foreign officials is prohibited only if the official "acts or refrains
from acting in breach of his duties." Id. Reservations are also permitted for the bribery of
foreign public assemblies. Id. art. 37.
198 Hugh C. Hansen, Introduction to Part I: Current Developments in European
Union Intellectual Property Law, in 3 INT'L INTELL. PROP. L. & POL'Y, supra note 8, at
1-1.
199 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter ROME TREATY].
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March 25, 1957 to enhance economic coordination among western
European nations.2°° The Rome Treaty generally referred to the
protection of industrial and commercial property, but did not
create a central authority to protect IP rights.2 °" Without a central
authority, member states were left to regulate their own national IP
laws subject to EU "guidance., 202 Over time, however, the EU
sought to directly protect IP rights through competition laws,
ensuring the free movement of goods and the consistent protection
of IP rights among member countries.0 3 Under Article 36 of the
Rome Treaty, the IP rights granted by any member state continue
200 The European Union originated from the European Community (EC), the group
of European nations bound by the Rome Treaty. The Rome Treaty was amended by the
SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT of Feb. 17 and 28, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, reprinted in 25
I.L.M. 503, and the TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN
UNION, THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN
RELATED ACTS, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 56 [hereinafter
TREATY OF AMSTERDAM]. This treaty was separately joined by the European Union as
the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224)
1, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 56, as amended by the TREATY OF AMSTERDAM. The Treaty of
Amsterdam was ratified on May 1, 1999. See France Ratifies EU Amsterdam Treaty
Amid Criticism, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 3, 1999, LEXIS, News Library, Agence
France-Presse File. There are four main EU institutions. The Council of Europe consists
of representatives of the twelve member nations. Every six months, the presidency of the
Council rotates. The Commission, consisting of seventeen members appointed for a four-
year term, initiates and maintains Community policy and brings actions of breach of
treaties before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The ECJ, made up of thirteen judges
and six advocates general, hears disputes among member nations, is the final authority
on implementation of treaties, and interprets Community law. The European Parliament
is the legislative body of the EC, which is made up of representatives from member
nations. The sources of EU law include: internal treaties, which provide broad guidelines
and apply Community law; regulations, which have general application and are binding
in their entirety on member states; and directives, which are the main instruments to
promote harmonization in corporate, tax and social laws. The directives are binding on
member nations, but the methods of compliance and incorporation in national laws are
left to the member nations; ECJ decisions are binding on member nations or the relevant
parties to the dispute. The EU is also bound by international conventions. Clare Germain,
EEC, in GERMAIN'S TRANSNATIONAL LAW RESEARCH IV-91 (1999). See, e.g., DOMNIK
LASOK & JOHN WILLIAM BRIDGE, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES (4th ed. 1987).
201 ROME TREATY, supra note 199, art. 30.
202 Id. art. 94. The Rome Treaty gave the EC Council the authority to direct
"approximation of such laws" that directly affected "the establishment or functioning of
the common market." TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, supra note 200, art. 94.
203 Paul Waterschoot, Overview of Recent Developments in Intellectual Property in
the European Union, in 3 INT'L INTELL. PROP. L. & POL'Y, supra note 8, at 2-1.
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under the EU and are afforded the full force of law.2 4
2. Know-how
Trade secrets are only indirectly recognized as an LP right in
the EU, in part, due to disagreements as to what information
deserves protection.205 Article 81(3)206 of the Rome Treaty is the
provision under which the EU has established most IP regulations.
However, most EU member nations recognize the commercial
value of confidential information that is the general foundation for
trade secret protection.2 7 Similarly, EU regulations and directives
indirectly recognize and protect "know-how" defined as "a
package of non-patented practical information, resulting from
experience and testing, which is secret, substantial and
identified., 20 8 The three necessary elements of know-how are
further defined as follows:
"secret" means that the know-how is not generally known or
easily accessible; "substantial" means that the know-how
includes information which is indispensable for the manufacture
of the contract products or the application of the contract
processes; "identified" means that the know-how is described in
a sufficiently comprehensive manner so as to make it possible to
verify that it fulfills the criteria of secrecy and
substantiality ....
Know-how rights are derived from patent law, where the
inventor is forced to disclose secrets to receive patent protection.210
204 ROME TREATY, supra note 199, art. 30; COHEN & GUTrERMAN, supra note 157,
at 429-30.
205 See MELVIN SIMENSKY ET AL., 2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE GLOBAL
MARKETPLACE § 25.10 (2d ed. 1999).
206 The Treaty provisions have been renumbered. Article 81(3) was formerly 85(3).
Except where cited in earlier treaties, this paper will refer to the relevant article under its
new number.
207 Id.
208 Commission Regulation No. 2659/2000 of 29 November 2000 on the
Application of Article 81(3) of the Rome Treaty to Categories of Research and
Development Agreements, art. 2, 2000 O.J. (L 304) 7, 10, available at
http://www.europa.eu.intleur-lexlenllif/dat/2000/en_300R2659.html.
209 Id. art. 2, at 10.
210 VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW AND
PRACTICE 281 (7th ed. 2000).
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EU law has recognized that an owner may license his patent and
know-how to others without violating competition laws.21' In
1989, the EU granted an exemption from competition rules for
pure know-how licensing agreements.212 In 1996, this regulation
was incorporated into the Technology Transfer Regulation 21 3 that
exempts the licensing of patent and know-how and "ancillary
provisions" regarding other IP rights. 24 Thus, indirectly, the
recognition and use of trade secret rights as know-how has been
established in IP licensing in the EU.
3. Other EU Legislation
Other EU legislation specifically refers to, and may indirectly
recognize, trade secret rights.
a. Data Protection
The EU provides extensive IP protection in the area of
databases. On March 11, 1996, the European Council and
European Parliament adopted the Directive on the Legal
Protection of Databases (Database Directive) 215 that extends a sui
generis2 6 right over the contents of databases. 21 7 The Database
Directive also recognizes an existing trade secret right, primarily
211 Id.
212 Commission Regulation No. 556/89 of November 1988 on the application of
Article 85(3) of the Rome Treaty to Certain Categories of Know-how Licensing
Agreements, 1989 O.J. (L 61) 1; KORAH, supra note 210, at 288 n.3.
213 Commission Regulation 240/96 of 31 January 1996 on the Application of Article
81(3) of the Rome Treaty to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements,
1996 O.J. (L 31) 2, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/enlif/dat/1996/en_396R0240
.html.
214 Id. art. 1(1).
215 Council Directive 96/9, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/enlif/dat/1996/en_396L0009.html.
216 Id. at 25-27. The sui generis right is:
[A] right for the maker of a database which shows that there has been
qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in either the
obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents to prevent extraction
and/or re-utilization of the whole or a substantial part, evaluated qualitatively
and/or quantitatively, of the contents of that database.
Id at 25. The EU required the incorporation of the Directive's provisions into national
laws of member states. Id.
217 Id.
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in member nations, stating that the Directive's provisions are
without prejudice to other laws regarding IP, unfair competition,
or trade secrets.218
b. Privacy
On October 24, 1998, EU Directive 95/46/EC on the
Protection of Individuals regarding the Processing of Personal
Data and the Free Movement of Such Data (Privacy Directive)
became effective.219 The Privacy Directive mandates regulatory
controls over the processing and maintenance of personal data.22°
Under this Directive, member states must enact national
regulations that protect the confidentiality of communications by
means of public telecommunications, networks, or services.221
Specifically, national regulations must ban the interception,
storage, or surveillance of communication without the consent of
the users concerned.222 The directive allows, by exception, national
regulations that safeguard national security, defense, and
investigation or prosecution of criminal offenses.223
The Privacy Directive, however, qualified the access right of
individuals to personal information stating, "this right must not
218 Id. art. 13. Article 13 states, "This Directive shall be without prejudice to
provisions concerning in particular copyright, rights related to copyright ...unfair
competition, trade secrets, security, confidentiality, data protection and privacy, access
to public documents, and the law of contract." Id. (emphasis added).
219 European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995
Protection of Individuals With Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and the Free
Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Privacy Directive], available
at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/enlif/dat/1995/en_395L0046.html. Although the Privacy
Directive was adopted on October 24, 1995, by resolution it did not become effective
until October 24, 1998.
220 Id. at 37-38. The EU extended this protection to the telecommunications sector
through Directive 97/66/EC [hereinafter Telecommunications Data Protection Directive].
European Parliament and Council Directive 97/66/EC of 15 December 1997 Concerning
the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Telecommunications
Sector, 1998 O.J. (L 24) 1, available at http://europa.eu.int/ eur-
lex/enilif/dat/1997/en_397L0066.html. The Directive applies to data on private
individuals or entities that are maintained as part of publicly available
telecommunications services and networks in the EU. Id. art. 1.
221 Telecommunications Data Protection Directive, supra note 220, at 1,.5.
222 Id.
223 Id. art. 14.1.
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adversely affect trade secrets or intellectual property .... 224
Therefore, through current legislation regarding privacy, the EU
indirectly recognizes trade secrets as an independent right. The
current EU-U.S. debate225 over data privacy may help focus
interest in cooperative efforts to protect trade secrets and decrease
economic espionage.226
c. Utility Models
Many European member states also afford protection for
"utility models," technical inventions that do not satisfy the
elements of patent protection.227 Similar to U.S. trade secrets, the
utility model offers a cheaper and faster method of protection, but
one that is less secure than patents.228 Nevertheless, a common
agreement in the EU for recognition of this right is problematic.229
Although utility models are common in European industry, this IP
system does not exist in all EU member states, and its application
among countries that do employ the system is inconsistent.23 ° In
1995, the EU produced a Green Paper proposing options for action
on utility models. 2 3 Respondents to the proposals have advocated
greater harmonization among member nations, but have
questioned an EU-wide system.232
Finally, the EU has recently recognized that the development
and manufacture of flavoring substances are "trade secrets" and
has recommended ways to protect them.233 Therefore, the
224 Privacy Directive, supra note 219, art. 41.
225 See Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU
and International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J.
INT'L L. 1, 27 (2000) (arguing that the U.S. system of ad hoc privacy protection in the
private sector, which relies on market forces to ensure privacy rights, is directly in
conflict with the EU's regulation of private sector data collection).
226 Id.
227 Waterschoot, supra note 203, at 2-12.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Commission Recommendation 98/282 of 21 April 1998 on Ways in Which
Member States and the Signatory States to the Agreement on the European Economic
Area Should Protect Intellectual Property in Connection with the Development and
[Vol. 27
BUSINESS WAR
foundation exists for greater harmonization of EU IP rights and for
the creation of a directive explicitly recognizing and protecting
trade secrets. Although political and economic differences are
obstacles to greater IP and trade secret protection, the EU's
inconsistent recognition of IP rights and weak protection of trade
secrets may divide the common market and impede greater trade
with the United States.234
B. The War of Economic Espionage Between the United
States and the EU
Despite increasing multinational efforts to protect trade
secrets, the United States and its European allies continue to wage
economic war via economic espionage. 235 After the Cold War,
many U.S. allies re-focused their foreign intelligence services on
U.S. corporations.236 Current American allies, including France,
Israel, Germany, South Korea, Russia, and Japan have been
implicated in this spying,237 committed through wiretapping
overseas phone calls, stealing computers, planting moles in U.S.
companies, and monitoring "open source" materials such as
commercial databases and trade journals.238 The U.S. government,
however, is not just a victim. The extent of recent U.S. espionage
was shown when U.S. intelligence agents were forced to leave
France after allegedly stealing economic and political secrets,239
eavesdropping on the Japanese delegation at the U.S.-Japan
automobile trade talks in Geneva in 1995,240 and were discovered
hacking into the EU Parliament and Commission e-mail to access
Manufacture of Flavouring Substances Referred to in Regulation (EC) No. 2232/96 of
the European Parliament and of the Council, 1998 O.J. (L 127) 32, available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/enlif/dat/1998/en_398H0282.html.
234 KORAH, supra note 210, at 278.
235 PETER SCHWEIZER, FRIENDLY SPIES: How AMERICA'S ALLIES ARE USING
ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE TO STEAL OUR SECRETS 2 (1993).
236 Darren Tucker, The Federal Government's War on Economic Espionage, 18 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1109, 1152 (1997).
237 Id. at 1116; SCHWEIZER, supra note 235, at 256.
238 Tucker, supra note 236, at 1123-25.
239 Douglas Waller, Spying: Halt! Friend or Foe?, TIME, Mar. 6, 1995, at 50.
240 Jim Landers, Foreign Spies Target Corporate Secrets, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Oct. 7, 1996, at ID.
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economic information during the GATT trade talks.24'
This covert war was made public when EU Parliament
ministers accused the United States and the United Kingdom of
using the "Echelon" Spy System located in England to intercept
European proprietary information and provide it to U.S.
companies.242 Subsequently, the EU established a committee that
is currently reviewing the matter to determine whether the rights
of European citizens are protected from intrusion by intelligence
services, whether European industry is at risk from global
espionage, and whether encryption is adequate to guarantee
privacy. 243 Formally, the United States denied the allegations of
spying. Former CIA Director James Woolsey, however, admitted
that the United States spied on foreign corporations, but only to
monitor sanctions and dual-use technology 2" and to protect U.S.
companies from bribery and corruption. 245 The hypocrisy of the
EU's allegations was revealed when news sources publicly
identified thirty other nations with eavesdropping capabilities,
including five European countries, that engage in economic
espionage.246 Most ironically, the French government, which
241 Tim Kelsey & David Leppard, American Spies Hack Into Euro Computers To
Steal Trade Secrets, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Aug. 4, 1996, at World 1.
242 Neil Buckley & Robert Graham, Europe: MEP's to Vote on Probe of US-UK
'Spying' Satellite, FIN. TIMES (London), July 5, 2000, at 8.
243 Ian Lynch, EU Makes Blueprint for Echelon Inquiry, at http://www.
vnunet.com/News/1 110830 (Sept. 9, 2000).
244 Intelligence Gathering and Democracies: The Issue of Economic and Industrial
Espionage, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 7, 2000, LEXIS, News Library, Federal News
Service File (publishing the briefing of Dr. James Woolsey, Former Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency). "Dual-use" technology includes products with legal,
legitimate uses such as chemicals or supercomputers that can also be used to make or
enhance illegal weapons of mass destruction. Id.
245 Id. Director Woolsey stated: "[T]he United States does not engage in industrial
espionage in the sense of collecting or even sorting intelligence that it collects overseas
for the benefit of and to be given to American corporations .... [Ninety-five] percent of
our [economic] intelligence collection is from open sources. Five percent is essentially
secrets that we steal. We steal secrets with espionage, with communications, with
reconnaissance satellites." Id. The two claims of American spying on European
companies included two French companies accused of bribing foreign officials to win
contracts: Thompson-CSF allegedly was bribing Brazilian officials, and Airbus allegedly
was bribing Saudi officials. Id.
246 Duncan Campbell & Paul Lashmar, Revealed: 30 More Nations with Spy
Stations, INDEP. (London), July 9, 2000, at 11.
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claimed to have been victimized by Echelon, had a similar global
network of spy satellites that collected foreign economic data.247
Nevertheless, there is increasing cooperation between the
United States and Europe to fight cyber-crime. In September of
2000, the United States sponsored a meeting of the G8's Senior
Law Enforcement Experts on Transnational Crime (Lyon
Group)248 to discuss international IP crime.249 The meeting focused
on the involvement of organized criminal groups in counterfeiting
and pirating merchandise, but the delegates also discussed the
possibility of mutual legal assistance and extradition agreements in
the area of IP crime.250 The Lyon Group endorsed various
recommendations, including sharing strategic intelligence
concerning organized criminal groups and sponsoring an annual
meeting on trends in IP crime and member countries' enforcement
activities.2
VI. Recommendations and Conclusion
A. The Case for Greater Trade Secret Protection
1. Offensive Economic Espionage
First, nations could enhance their IP and trade secret rights by
forming an agreement to prohibit offensive economic espionage.
Proponents of offensive economic espionage argue that the U.S.
government has long had legal authority to conduct such acts, and
that the United States must continue these efforts to respond to
foreign economic espionage.252 These proponents further contend
that the U.S. government is exempted from civil or criminal
247 Id.
248 The G8 consists of the United States, Canada, France, Germany, the United
Kingdom, Italy, Japan, the Russian Federation, and the EC. The Lyon Group is the G8
law enforcement subgroup. Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, U.S.
Department of Justice, G8 Law Enforcement Experts Agree to Examine Transborder IP
Crime, Sept. 18-19, 2000, at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/G8experts.htm.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Brandon J. Witkow, A New "Spook" Immunity: How the CIA and American
Businesses Are Shielded from Liability for the Misappropriation of Trade Secrets, 14
EMORY INT'LL. REv. 451, 461 (2000).
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liability for economic espionage, and should therefore more
directly assist private companies by disclosing to them any foreign
trade secrets it discovers. 253  Although historically the U.S.
intelligence agencies have informally apprised U.S. businesses of
foreign threats,254 this expanded official role in offensive economic
espionage is problematic. U.S. economic espionage risks
retaliation from victim countries, damaged credibility when
encouraging international agreements, and diminished respect for
U.S. IP. Furthermore, conducting economic espionage might
violate existing U.S. treaty commitments.255 Practically, this new
role would require initial determinations of what constituted an
"American" company and what foreign economic data was a trade
secret and would be valuable to U.S. businesses.256
Furthermore, offensive economic espionage during peacetime
violates international law as a form of invasion on the territorial
integrity and sovereignty of foreign nations. 257 To date, however,
espionage is not prohibited by any international convention
because all nations maintain an interest in spying.258 Nevertheless,
253 Id. at 475. The author proposes government immunity under the UTSA and the
EEA for the theft of foreign trade secrets based on the state action exemption in antitrust
law. Id.
254 Michael T. Clark, Economic Espionage: The Role of the United States
Intelligence Community, 3 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 253 (1997).
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Myres S. McDougal et al., The Intelligence Function and the World Public
Order, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 365, 394 (1973). See also Quincy Wright, Espionage and the
Doctrine of Non-Intervention in Internal Affairs, in ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (Roland J. Stranger ed., 1962). The principle of territorial
integrity is recognized in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. U.N. CHARTER art.
2, para. 4. Other scholars, however, believe that the prevalence of peacetime espionage
has rendered it legal through constant practice. McDougal et al., supra, at 393.
258 W. Hays Parks, The International Law of Intelligence Collection, in NATIONAL
SECURITY LAW 433-34 (John Norton Moore et al. eds., 1990). The author describes the
inherently self-interested nature of domestic espionage law, stating:
Each nation endeavors to deny intelligence gathering within its territory through
domestic laws . . . [that] are promulgated in such a way as to deny foreign
intelligence collection efforts within a nation's territory without inhibiting that
nation's efforts to collect intelligence about other nations. No serious proposal
has ever been made within the international community to prohibit intelligence
collection as a violation of international law because of the tacit
acknowledgement by nations that it is important to all, and practiced by each.
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the increasing importance of IP may force nations to redefine their
traditional notions of the value of offensive economic espionage
and determine whether it is in their political and economic
interests to negotiate such a convention.
2. Vulnerability to Criminal Organizations
The failure of countries to criminalize the theft of IP and the
increasing use of economic espionage by state and non-state actors
increases vulnerability to criminal organizations. 59 Increasingly,
criminal organizations are infringing on IP rights to facilitate
criminal enterprises involving guns, drugs, pornography, and
terrorism. 26 ° Former Attorney General Janet Reno stated that the
failure to protect IP created "a nutrient environment for official
corruption ... and an increase in crimes financed by intellectual
property theft., 26 1 Industrial espionage, however, has- become an
essential part of international business. To gain a competitive
edge, corporations employ every means at their disposal, including
the use of "retired" personnel from intelligence services, to learn
the secrets of their business rivals.262 Driven by profit, such
corporations may intentionally or unwittingly employ individuals
or organizations that are fronts for criminal organizations or
Id.
259 See generally Janet Reno, The Threat of Digital Theft, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD
(Jan. 1, 2001), at http://www.thestandard.com/article/0, I 902,20985,00.htm.
260 Id. T 5.
261 Id. T3.
262 Neil King Jr. & Jess Bravin, Corporate-Spying Finns Thrive: CIA Veterans,
Dumpster-Divers Work in 'Competitive Intelligence': 'If the Trash is on the Curb, It's
Fair Game,' WALL ST. J. (Europe), July 4, 2000, available at 2000 WL-WSJE
21065482. For example, Motorola's intelligence team is lead by an ex-CIA operative. Id.
There are even trade associations for these professionals with thousands of members. Id.
One such trade association, the Society for Competitive Intelligence Professionals
[hereinafter SCIP], states its mission as "helping professionals develop expertise in
creating, collecting, and analyzing information; disseminating competitive intelligence;
and engaging decision-makers in a productive dialogue that creates organizational
competitive advantage." SCIP, About SCIP, at http://www.scip.org/aboutlmission.asp
(last visited Oct. 12, 2001). U.S. and foreign companies use "competitive intelligence," a
dignified term for spying, to acquire information about competitors' products
clandestinely. Id. Corporate intelligence often includes gaining information legally by
overhearing conversations at trade shows and airports, combing through U.S. Patent
Office filings and the Internet, digging through the trash of a rival business, and taking
photographs of their buildings and factories. Id.
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263foreign intelligence services.  The increase in government-
sponsored economic espionage makes trade secrets of private
companies more vulnerable and increases their cost of protection
from all sources of theft.264
3. Economic Instability
Furthermore, weak trade secret laws and offensive economic
espionage inhibit economic growth. Economically, IP laws
provide a level playing field that induces, rather than inhibits,
competition and invention.265 Specifically, "[e]ntitlements are
allocated to specific creators, to safeguard their information
against expropriation, so that bargaining can facilitate an exchange
and a market is created., 266 Enhanced trade secret protection
discourages the "free-rider '2 67 and encourages companies or
countries to create rather than copy an invention, thereby creating
a greater number and variety of products for public
consumption.268  Conversely, offensive economic espionage
inhibits invention and negates the market incentive to create.269
Theft of trade secrets through corruption and bribery also has
economic consequences. Corruption makes economies less
competitive because it undermines investment and leads to capital
outflows. 27 ° Furthermore, the more resources the U.S. government
and U.S. companies spend on measures to perpetuate or defend
263 Robert L. Tucker, Industrial Espionage as Unfair Competition, 29 U. TOL. L.
REV. 245, 248 (1998). The recruitment and placement of moles in U.S. corporations has
been reported to be "relatively easy." Id. Foreign intelligence agencies routinely send
students to study or work in America and report on scientific developments and
classified technology.:Id. There is a close connection between IP-related crime, including
economic espionage, and other criminal acts such as gun smuggling, drugs, money
laundering, and even terrorism. See Reno, supra note 259.
264 ASIS REPORT, supra note 4, at 3.
265 ANSELM K. SANDERS, UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW: THE PROTECTION OF
INTELLECTUAL AND INDUSTRIAL CREATIVITY 101 (1997).
266 Id.
267 Id. A "free-rider" is an individual, company, or country that copies or steals the
invention of another to reduce the time and cost of producing the product independently.
See id.
268 Id. at 102.
269 See id.
270 Helmut Sohmen, Critical Importance of Controlling Corruption, 33 INT'L LAW.
863, 870 (1999).
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against foreign espionage, the less money is available for public
projects or tax incentives that might enhance private research and
development.27 Therefore, greater protection of trade secret rights
through international and bilateral agreements, and decreased
offensive economic espionage would protect citizens and private
companies and foster economic growth throughout the world.7
B. The Nature of an Agreement Between the United States
and the EU
1. A Direct U.S. -EU Agreement on Trade Secrets
The foundation for a U.S.-EU agreement on trade secrets and
economic espionage exists in the 1999 Agreement on Mutual
Recognition Between the European Community and the United
States of America (Recognition Treaty).273 The Recognition Treaty
specifies the conditions under which the two parties will accept or
recognize the "conformity assessment procedures" of the other
party's authorities.274 In Article 17, the United States and the EU
agree to maintain the confidentiality of information exchanged
under the Recognition Treaty, and not to disclose or permit their
governmental bodies to disclose confidential information,
including trade secrets.275 The Article is a direct recognition of and
provision for trade secret rights, but each party is only required to
protect these rights to the extent it is required to under its own
laws. 276 Thus, U.S. trade secret rights may still receive less
protection in the EU under this agreement.2" Furthermore, the
271 Cf. Clark, supra note 254, at 290 (discussing the possibility that increased
economic espionage activity may lead to a new economic Cold War).
272 See id.
273 Council Decision of 22 June 1998 on the Conclusion of an Agreement on Mutual
Recognition Between the European Community and the United States of America,
(199978/EC) [hereinafter Recognition Treaty], April 2, 1999 O.J. (L 31) 3, available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/1999/en-399D0078.html.
274 Id. art. 2.
275 Id. art. 17. Article 17 states that "[N]either Party shall disclose to the public, nor
permit a conformity assessment body to disclose to the public, information exchanged
under this Agreement that constitutes trade secrets, confidential commercial or financial
information, or information that relates to an ongoing investigation." Id.
276 Id. art. 3.
277 Id.
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Recognition Treaty only applies to confidential information in
conformity assessments, rather than a general agreement to respect
and protect the other party's trade secrets.278 However, the
Recognition Treaty provides a framework for additional
agreements that more explicitly recognize and protect all trade
secrets and prohibit offensive economic espionage.279
To achieve the greatest protection for trade secrets, the
proposed agreement should be based on the most expansive
provisions of the UTSA and the EEA. Trade secrets could be
defined, as in Article 1(4) of the UTSA, as any information that is
not generally known or readily ascertainable but that derives
independent economic value and is the subject of reasonable
efforts to maintain its secrecy. 280 Similarly, the agreement could
define misappropriation as inappropriate acquisition, use, or
disclosure. 281 The criminalization of trade secret theft could be
based on the EEA, including § 1837 that extends jurisdiction
extraterritorially.
282
2. Additional Components of the Proposed Agreement
As part of a proposed trade secret agreement or other
agreements protecting IP, the United States and EU should update
their extradition treaties to provide for the extradition of non-state
individuals wanted for economic espionage. 83 Unlike the United
States, many countries with civil law traditions, such as France,
either do not extradite citizens charged with crimes in other
countries or severely limit the conditions under which they
extradite citizens.2 84 To achieve true cooperation, these nations
278 Id. art. 4.
279 Id. art. 2.
280 UTSA § 1(4).
281 BOUCHOUX, supra note 54, at 439.
282 18 U.S.C. § 1837(1)-(2) (1996).
283 Jacqueline Klosek, The Development of International Police Cooperation Within
the EU and Between the EU and Third Party States: A Discussion of the Legal Bases of
Such Cooperation and the Problems and Promises Resulting Thereof, 14 AM. U. INT'L
L. REV. 599, 631 (1999); Jesse Hallee, The Sheinbein Legacy: Israel's Refusal to Grant
Extradition as a Model of Complexity, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 667, 688 (2000).
284 Joshua S. Spector, Extraditing Mexican Nationals in the Fight Against
International Narcotics Crimes, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1018 n.90 (noting that many
governments, particularly European and other civil law nations, including France,
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should agree to extradite their own citizens charged with trade
secret theft and expand their lists of extraditable crimes to include
white-collar offenses such as industrial spying. 285 Furthermore,
European nations should follow the OECD and COE conventions
on bribery and pass national legislation banning all corruption.286
A major obstacle to any proposed agreement is the close
connection of the public and private sectors in Europe.287 Many
European intelligence services claim that their budgets are
indirectly funded by successful offensive economic espionage,
which benefits their country's economy. 288 Thus, it is doubtful
these foreign intelligence agencies will take steps to diminish this
source of revenue until forced by national legislation.289
3. Trade Secret Protection Through Unfair Competition
Law
Alternatively, if the United States and the EU cannot agree to
recognize trade secrets as IP, or to explicitly prohibit industrial
espionage, then an agreement could seek to prevent disclosure and
use of this information as unfair competition.290 The commitment
to do so already exists. The TRIPS Agreement protects trade
secrets through unfair competition by affording the trade secret
owner the right to prevent others from disclosing or acquiring the
confidential information without consent.29'
Germany, and Switzerland, refuse to extradite their nationals). Although all member
states of the Council of Europe are signatories to the European Convention on
Extradition, the treaty allows countries to define who constitutes a "national" and refuse
to extradite these individuals if it is contrary to their legal traditions. European
Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, Art. 3(2), Art. 6, 359 U.N.T.S. 273, 280. See
also Klosek, supra note 283, at 631; Hallee, supra note 283, at 683-84.
285 Klosek, supra note 283, at 655-56.
286 George et al., supra note 191, at 492-98.
287 Clark, supra note 254, at 288-89.
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 E.g., ANTITRUST LAWS & TRADE REGULATIONS § 5.04 (Matthew Bender & Co.
2d ed. 2000). But see Susy Frankel, Unfair Competition Law: Over Protection Stifles the
Very Creative Force it is Supposed to Nurture, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW WORLD 269 (Charles E.F. Rickett & Graeme W.
Austin eds., 2000) (arguing that the establishment of a separate law of unfair competition
in New Zealand would chill competition).
291 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 169, art. 39(2).
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Further, the foundation for protection through unfair
competition exists in both U.S. and EU law. In the United States,
courts have applied tort law, holding that misappropriating a
competitor's business information constitutes unfair
competition. 2" Further, unfair competition law extends protection
beyond trade secrets to other valuable proprietary information that
does not rise to the level of trade secrets, and that is
misappropriated through industrial espionage.2 93 As stated in
Section V,2 94 the EU has historically based its IP protection on
regulating competition.295 Article 82 of the EC Treaty prohibits the
abuses of a "dominant" position held within the EU or a
substantial part of it.296 The mere holding of an IP right, or the
exercise of this right by a dominant firm, is not in itself an abusive
act. 297 The EU courts, however, have found IP abuses by dominant
companies when there was an abusive registration of trademarks
to divide markets, unfair licensing terms, and abusive and
frivolous infringement actions.298
The model for this agreement could be based on the WIPO
Model Provisions on Protection against Unfair Competition.299
Article 6 of these Model Provisions defines, and prohibits, unfair
competition with respect to "Secret Information" and provides a
framework for greater trade secret protection and decreasing
292 Tucker, supra note 263, at 250.
293 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939). The tort of unfair competition is focused
on the nature of the party's conduct, rather than on the nature of the property
misappropriated. The Restatement provides that wrongful misappropriation is
independently tortious, even when information is not a trade secret. Id. cmt. b. Comment
b states: "The tort of unfair competition is focused on the nature of the party's conduct,
rather than the nature of the property misappropriated." Id.
294 See supra notes 198-251 and accompanying text.
295 Waterschoot, supra note 203, at 37.
296 ROME TREATY, supra note 199, art. 82.
297 LAURENT GARZANITI, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, BROADCASTING AND THE
INTERNET: E.U. COMPETITION LAW AND REGULATION 180 (2000); Case 107/76,
Hoffman-La Roche v. CentraFarm, 1978 E.C.R. 1-1139.
298 GARZANITI, supra note 297, at 180 (citing CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY ET AL.,
COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION (Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed. 1993)).
299 Model Provisions on Protection against Unfair Competition, No. 832 (E)
(Geneva, WIPO, 1996), reprinted in ANSELM KAMPERMAN SANDERS, UNFAIR
COMPETITION LAW: THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL AND INDUSTRIAL CREATIVITY
app. (1997).
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offensive economic espionage.3
C. Conclusion
Modem technology has facilitated a dramatic rise in economic
espionage committed by private companies, criminal
organizations, and national governments.30 ' Information is a vital
asset of the global economy and is vulnerable to economic
espionage if not adequately protected by national laws and
international agreements.30 2 In response to these trends, the United
States has enhanced its civil and criminal trade secret protection in
federal laws.30 3 The inconsistent adoption of the UTSA under state
laws, the limited use of the EEA, and the indirect and unreliable
trade secret protection internationally, however, puts the
confidential information of U.S. businesses at risk. Given the
nature of technology, trade secret protection is becoming a
common form of IP right and must receive commensurately
heightened and explicit recognition in bilateral and multilateral
agreements. 3' To protect IP and sustain economic growth and
trade, the United States and the EU should agree to increase their
trade secret protection and reduce offensive economic espionage.
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300 Id. art 6.
301 Cybercrime, Transnational Crime, and Intellectual Property Theft: Hearing
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